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TEXAS V. UNITED STATES: MIND THE GAP
SEAN CUNNIFF*
INTRODUCTION
The ability of Indian tribes to own and operate casino-style gaming operations
faces an uncertain future following the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Texas v. United
States.1 The decision enables determined state governments to prevent tribes from
ever engaging in certain lucrative gaming enterprises. The decision has the potential to dramatically alter the playing field in Indian gaming in states where Indian
gaming does not currently exist, firmly placing the power in the hands of state
governments and leaving tribes with virtually no hope of opening casinos.
Indian gaming has evolved as a core aspect of tribal self-determination and economic self-sufficiency. The combination of pressing tribal economic needs, inconsistent support and policies from the federal government, and evolving tribal
sovereignty has enhanced the need for tribal economic development. Indian gaming has rapidly emerged as an integral element in tribal economies. In 2007, tribal
casinos generated more than $26 billion in revenue, compared to only $200 million
in 1998.2 Of the 562 tribes recognized by the U.S. government, about 220 operate
382 total gaming operations across the United States.3
Indian gaming is regulated under the Federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA).4 IGRA prescribes the process by which tribes and states reach agreements, called compacts, that authorize Las Vegas-style gaming.5 Absent such a
compact, this type of Indian gaming is prohibited.6
The process of negotiating compacts was designed to provide balance between
tribes and states in the negotiating process, but with the ultimate objective being
encouragement of the enactment of an agreement.7 Congress sought to ensure this
outcome by providing tribes with a remedy to sue states for failure to bargain a
compact in good faith. However, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated that remedy
in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, citing state sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment.8 In response, the Secretary of the Interior promulgated
new administrative procedures (Secretarial Procedures) governing compact negotiations that sought to preserve Congress’s desire to enable successful compact negotiations without trampling upon the constitutional rights at bar in Seminole.9
Texas v. United States involves a challenge brought by the federally recognized
Kickapoo Traditional Tribe (Tribe or Kickapoo) to compel the State of Texas to

* Class of 2010, University of New Mexico School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Thomas
Bird Bear for his insight and guidance, and my editors, Jackie McLean, Dave Gordon, and Neil Bell for their
tireless and constructive efforts to better this article.
1. 497 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2007).
2. Press Release, Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, NIGC Announces 2007 Indian Gaming Revenues
(June 2008), http://www.nigc.gov/ReadingRoom/PressReleases/PR93062008/tabid/841/Default.aspx (last visited June 3, 2009).
3. See id. (stating there are 382 total gaming operations run by tribes in the United States).
4. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (1988).
5. Under IGRA, Las Vegas-style slot and table gaming is categorized as Class III. Id. § 2703(8).
6. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(C), invalidated by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
7. KATHRYN R.L. RAND & STEVEN A. LIGHT, INDIAN GAMING LAW AND POLICY 58 (2006).
8. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 73 (1996).
9. 25 C.F.R. § 291 (2009).
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negotiate a gaming compact with the Tribe under the Secretarial Procedures.10 The
Tribe first approached the State of Texas in 1995 to discuss the possibility of negotiating a compact.11 Texas refused to negotiate, and the Tribe sued, alleging Texas’s
failure to negotiate in good faith as mandated by IGRA.12 However, before that
lawsuit was resolved, Seminole invalidated the good faith remedy, negating the
basis for the Tribe’s action. Following enactment of the Secretarial Procedures, the
Kickapoo tried again—complying with the Secretarial Procedures, but again Texas
resisted, giving rise to Texas v. United States.13
In Texas, the Fifth Circuit invalidated the Secretarial Procedures, concluding
that the rules constituted an impermissible interpretation of congressional authority set forth in IGRA.14 The court relied primarily upon the Chevron doctrine,15 a
test extracted from Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.16 The Chevron test sets forth a standard for determining when deference to
administrative agency rulemaking is appropriate.17 As a result of its decision in
Texas, the Fifth Circuit makes it nearly impossible for tribes within its jurisdiction
to compel recalcitrant states to bargain gaming compacts in a good faith manner.18
This note will focus on the context surrounding the Texas decision and the
court’s rationale therein. It will include an appraisal of the arguments relied upon
by the court and those it disregarded. In particular, it will scrutinize the court’s
application of the Chevron standard to the Secretarial Procedures. This note will
also provide an analysis of the Secretary’s authority to promulgate the disputed
rules pursuant to general statutory authority derived from the agency’s federal
trust obligations to Indian tribes. This source of authority went largely disregarded
in Texas. The analysis of the Fifth Circuit’s actions provided in this note finds that
the court failed to adequately consider the full range of issues present in the case,
resulting in serious consequences for the Kickapoo and other tribes similarly situated. The article will conclude with an appraisal of what political and legal responses might be prompted by the court’s actions in Texas.
I. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS
Before getting into an analysis of the Fifth Circuit’s decision, it is useful to undertake a quick examination of the historical context of the Texas decision. The
roots of the Fifth Circuit’s actions can be traced back to the Marshall Court, where
the Chief Justice famously declared that Indian tribes are entitled to the protection
of the United States as “domestic, dependent nations.”19 Marshall’s words created

10. 497 F.3d 491, 495 (5th Cir. 2007).
11. Texas v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 2d 765, 767 (W.D. Tex. 2004).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Texas, 497 F.3d at 493.
15. Id. at 500–10.
16. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
17. Id. at 842–43.
18. However, there remain at least two possible remedies consistent with Texas and Seminole; a state
may consent to being sued or the U.S. Attorney General may still sue states to enforce IGRA. The prospect of
a federal suit is considered later in this article. See infra Part V.
19. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 2 (1831). Cherokee Nation is part of the “Marshall
trilogy,” which includes three cases that provide the basis for modern American Indian Law. The other two
cases that constitute the trilogy are Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (holding that Indians
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the basis for modern American Indian Law and the unique trust relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government.20 In the intervening 178 years
since Marshall penned Cherokee Nation, U.S. policy governing Indian relations has
vacillated schizophrenically, ranging between efforts to assimilate, terminate, and
empower tribal communities.21
Today, we are in an era of tribal empowerment through “self-determination.”
The period of self-determination began to take shape in the 1960s and is characterized by a renewed commitment to tribal sovereignty and control.22 At the heart of
this approach are tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and selfgovernment.23
Successful realization of self-determination and enhanced tribal sovereignty is
predicated on the achievement of partial or total tribal economic self-sufficiency.
Tribes that are better positioned economically are better able to exercise effective
self-government, keep tribal communities intact, and solidify tribal sovereignty.24
Indian gaming has proven to be one of the most reliable sources of economic development for tribes.25 Tribes have become increasingly reliant on gaming operations to fund tribal programs and to provide employment for tribal members.26
The Kickapoo Tribe is among the tribes aspiring to enjoy the economic and
other benefits of tribal gaming.27 The Tribe occupies a small 125-acre reservation in
the Rio Grande Valley, near the Mexico border and Eagle Pass, Texas.28 The reservation is home to 420 tribal members.29
The history of the Kickapoo Tribe is characterized by a constant struggle to
survive. At the time of first European contact, the Tribe occupied lands in currentday lower Michigan.30 The incursions of European traders in the late 1700s forced
have the right of occupancy but not fully alienable title to their lands) and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515 (1832) (holding that states’ laws do not apply in Indian Country).
20. The federal government owes a special fiduciary “trust” obligation to tribes and Congress exercises
near absolute plenary authority to dispatch this duty. This unique federal–tribal relationship finds root in
treaties, acts of Congress, the Constitution, and federal jurisprudence dating back to the Marshall trilogy. At
its most basic, the relationship is a grant of federal guardianship and a promise to provide services in exchange
for tribal cessions of land. The trust relationship involves a wide range of services, including education, healthcare, etc., provided to enrolled tribal members by the federal government. See WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR.,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 34–36 (West 2004).
21. STEPHEN CORNELL ET AL., ECONOMICS RESOURCE GROUP, INC., AMERICAN INDIAN GAMING
POLICY AND ITS SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS 3 (1998).
22. Id.
23. This manifests clearly in IGRA itself. See 25 U.S.C. § 2701(4) (1988).
24. Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Raising the Stakes: Tribal Sovereignty and Indian Gaming in
North Dakota, 5 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 329, 330 (2001).
25. CORNELL, supra note 21, at 24–40.
26. Id.
27. The tribe currently operates the Kickapoo Lucky Eagle Casino near Eagle Pass, Texas. It is a Class
II (non-Las Vegas–style) facility, offering bingo, poker, and bingo machines. Kickapoo Lucky Eagle Casino,
http://www.kickapooluckyeaglecasino.com/ english// (last visited June 3, 2009). Class II Indian gaming may be
conducted without the consent of the state. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)–(c) (1988). For a discussion of the different
Classes of gaming, see below, notes fifty-five to sixty-two and accompanying text. The Texas litigation involves
the Tribe’s efforts to conduct Las Vegas-style, Class III gaming.
28. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *6, Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Tex. v. Texas, No. 07-1109
(U.S. 2008), 2008 WL 534792, cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 32 (2008).
29. U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Census, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=
25000US1775&-qr_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U_DP1&-ds_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U&-reg=DEC_2000_SFAIA
N_DP3:08N—57N;&-redoLog=false&-format=&-_sse=on&-CONTEXT=qt (last visited June 3, 2009).
30. E. JOHN GESICK, JR., THE TEXAS KICKAPOO: KEEPERS OF TRADITION 5 (1996).

R

\\server05\productn\N\NMX\39-3\NMX303.txt

530

unknown

Seq: 4

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

18-JUN-10

11:45

[Vol. 39

the Kickapoo to enter a pattern of warfare, migration, shifting alliances, and
splintering into bands, all born out of a desire to preserve tribal culture and autonomy.31 By 1833, the Tribe had lost all of its ancestral lands and Tribal members
were dispersed throughout the south central United States and northern Mexico.32
The Texas Kickapoo first settled in the Eagle Pass area in the 1940s, fleeing
difficult agricultural conditions in Mexico.33 The Tribe’s initial settlement of cardboard dwellings underneath the bridge connecting Mexico to the United States
reflected their strained circumstances.34 The Kickapoos turned to migrant farm labor for employment and began to send their children to local schools.35 By 1989,
the Tribe gained federal recognition and moved to a new reservation away from
the bridge.36
Despite this progress, the economic circumstances of reservation occupants remain dire. Census data from 2000 revealed a deeply impoverished community:
more than 68 percent of tribal families subsisted below the poverty level, compared to 12 percent statewide in Texas.37 Additionally, unemployment was 16.1
percent on the reservation, but only 3.8 percent statewide.38 Finally, median household income was $8,542 compared to $39,927 for Texas generally.39
The Kickapoo Tribe’s interest in Indian gaming centers around the Tribe’s
pressing need for economic development. The Tribe intended to use gaming as a
means of generating employment and revenue to fund services for tribal members.40 However, the decision in Texas leaves the tribe without the ability to pursue
its gaming aspirations and undertake much-needed economic development.
II. REGULATORY AND LEGAL BACKDROP
Indian gaming took root in the form of high-stakes bingo halls in the 1970s and
1980s.41 The emergence of tribal gaming facilities adjacent to urban areas in California and Florida prompted state and local government officials to take notice.
These officials sought to enforce state and local laws regulating gaming activities
against the tribal gaming enterprises.
In California, the emergence of high-stakes tribal bingo operations near Palm
Springs and Los Angeles prompted a showdown between the state and the
Cabazon and Morongo Bands of Mission Indians.42 The jackpot amounts at the
tribal casinos exceeded those authorized under state law and applicable county

31. See id. at 16.
32. Id. at 11.
33. Id. at 17–18.
34. Id. at 20.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 25.
37. See U.S. Census Factfinder, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=25000
US1775&-qr_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U_DP3&-ds_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U&-reg=DEC_2000_SFAIAN_DP
3:08N—57N;&-redoLog=false&-format=&-_sse=on&-CONTEXT=qt (last visited June 3, 2009).
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *6, Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Tex. v. Texas, No. 07-1109 (U.S.
2008), 2008 WL 534792, cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 32 (2008).
41. See RAND, supra note 7, at 24.
42. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 205–06 (1983).
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ordinances. When the state tried to enforce its laws, the tribe invoked its tribal
sovereignty and sued in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.43
Cabazon rejected the state’s efforts to impose jurisdiction on the tribal gaming
operations. The state claimed that the bingo hall operations of the Cabazon and
Morongo Bands exposed the state to organized crime risks.44 The court rejected
this argument, concluding that the “compelling” federal and tribal interests at issue
outweighed the state’s claims.45 It concluded that the state already allowed a wide
range of gaming activities and that there was no evidence that the casino operation
had been infiltrated by organized crime.46
California’s setback in Cabazon prompted a movement to pressure Congress to
devise a regulatory scheme for the burgeoning tribal gaming industry. Both tribes
and states made their competing cases to Congress.47 States expressed their desire
to enforce state criminal and gaming laws on tribal lands.48 States also expressed
concerns about preserving state policies toward gaming generally and preventing
any influx of organized crime.49 In particular, states were concerned about the introduction of Las Vegas-style Indian gaming.50 Tribes also conceded the need for
regulation, but from the federal rather than the state government,51 citing longstanding concerns regarding incursions on tribal sovereignty by state
governments.52
These myriad interests resulted in the promulgation of IGRA in 1988.53 IGRA
embodied a balance between the three sovereigns at play: authority over Indian
gaming would be shared among tribal, state, and federal governments. Congress’s
findings upon enacting the legislation reflected the spirit of the self-determination
era and the promise of gaming for tribal economic development. To wit, Congress
affirmed that “a principal goal of Federal Indian policy is to promote tribal economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government.”54
The regulatory infrastructure implemented under IGRA took into account state
concerns regarding oversight of Las Vegas-style gaming. IGRA segregated different types of gaming into three classes, with degrees of regulation corresponding to
each class:
Class I: Traditional bingo games55
43. Id. at 206.
44. Id. at 220–21.
45. The Court determined that the interests of the tribes and federal government were similar. For the
federal government, as the guardian of tribes with longstanding fiduciary obligations to the tribes, its paramount concerns were furthering tribal sovereignty, self-government, self-sufficiency and economic development. For the tribes, the Court posited that the casinos were an important source of economic development
and employment, without which tribal self-determination efforts would be undermined. Id. at 218–21.
46. Id. at 221–22.
47. Joseph M. Kelly, Indian Gaming Law, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 501, 504–05 (1994).
48. RAND, supra note 7, at 30.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 32.
51. Id. at 31.
52. State governments generally may not exercise jurisdiction in Indian Country. Absent an explicit
congressional decree, states must steer clear of tribal lands. This principle dates back to Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), the third case in the famous Marshall trilogy, which provides the foundation for
American Indian Law.
53. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (1988).
54. Id. § 2701(4).
55. Id. § 2703(6).
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Class II: Bingo and nonbanked card games56
Class III: Casino-style games57
The higher the stakes, the higher the number of the class. As the classes ascend,
so does the intensity of regulatory oversight. Class I activities are outside of the
scope of IGRA altogether and entirely within the regulatory domain of tribal governments.58 Class II gaming is subject to tribal regulation with federal oversight.59
Class III gaming is subject to the greatest regulatory scrutiny. As a predicate
matter, such gaming activity is only allowed in states that already permit casinostyle gaming.60 Further, before Class III gaming may take place, a state–tribal compact must be negotiated between the state and tribal governments, subject to the
approval of the U.S. Secretary of the Interior (Secretary).61 The compact functions
as an agreement between the two parties and sets forth the terms of Class III
gaming between the particular state and tribe. Once a compact is in place, gaming
is conducted pursuant to the terms of that agreement and is also subject to various
IGRA regulations and federal oversight.62
IGRA sets forth a clearly delineated process by which compacts are negotiated.
Congress created the process to ensure balanced input between states and tribes,
but ultimately sought to ensure that the compacting process would result in successful agreements.63 The process is as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

A tribe formally requests that the state enter into compact negotiations.64
The state has 180 days to negotiate.65
If the state fails to respond, or no compact results, then the tribe may sue in
federal court, alleging bad faith bargaining on the part of the state.66
The tribe must establish a prima facie case,67 then the burden shifts to the
state to establish that it bargained in good faith.68
If a court determines that the state acted in bad faith, that court orders the
state to complete a compact within sixty days.69
If no agreement is reached within sixty days, the court appoints a mediator
and each side submits its “last best” proposal.70

56. Id. § 2703(7). In a nonbanked card game, players compete against one another, not the casino
dealer. Poker is a common example of a Class II nonbanked card game. RAND, supra note 7, at 48–49.
57. Class III games include slot machines, banked card games (baccarat, blackjack, etc.) and other
games including roulette, craps, and keno. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8).
58. Id. § 2710(a)(1).
59. Id. §§ 2706(b), 2710(a)(2).
60. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(B). Texas permits a broad range of Class III-type gaming, including casino-style
games. This matter was not at issue in the Texas litigation. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *7 n.17, Kickapoo
Traditional Tribe of Tex. v. Texas, No. 07-1109 (U.S. 2008), 2008 WL 534792, cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 32 (2008).
61. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1), (8).
62. Id.
63. RAND, supra note 7, at 58.
64. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(i), invalidated by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i).
67. A tribe may establish the prima facie case in one of two ways. It may present evidence that: (1) the
state never responded to the tribe’s request to negotiate a compact, or (2) that the state and tribe failed to
reach a compact. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(b)(ii).
68. Id.
69. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii).
70. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv).
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7.

The mediator selects the proposal that “best comports with the terms of
[IGRA] and any other applicable federal law and with the findings and order of the court.”71
8. The mediator then forwards the selection to both the tribe and the state.
Both parties have sixty days to review the selected proposal. If the state
accedes, then the compact is treated as though successfully negotiated and is
forwarded to the Secretary for approval.72
9. If the state disapproves, then the Secretary and the tribe collaborate to draft
a compact, taking into account the mediator’s compact, IGRA’s provisions,
and state law. This compact then takes effect.73
10. Finally, the Secretary may reject any compact for any of three reasons set
forth in IGRA:
• The compact violates an IGRA provision
• The compact violates federal law
• The compact compromises the federal government’s trust obligation to
tribes74
The process set forth in IGRA clearly puts the onus on the states to bargain a
compact in good faith.75 The provision allowing tribes to sue states on a bad faith
basis after the initial 180 day period of negotiations favors productive bargaining.
A finding of bad faith puts tremendous pressure on the state to successfully bargain an agreement, or it runs the risk that one will be implemented through mediation or via the Secretary. The key ingredient that enhances the likelihood of
successful negotiation in the face of a recalcitrant state is the good faith lawsuit
provision. This provision is essential in ensuring that tribes are able to successfully
enter into compact agreements and further their economic self-development goals
through tribal gaming enterprises.
However, the Supreme Court invalidated the suit provision in a 1996 decision,
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.76 The Court found it to be inconsistent with
states’ Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity rights.77 The Eleventh Amendment states: “The juridical power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any foreign
state.”78 The Supreme Court has construed the Eleventh Amendment to generally
bar suits against the states without state consent.79

71. Id.
72. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vi).
73. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii). The Secretary is authorized to sue the state in federal court to enforce a
compact adopted under this mechanism. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(iii).
74. Id. § 2710(d)(8)(B).
75. See id. § 2710(d).
76. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
77. Id. at 47.
78. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
79. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that a federal court may not entertain an action
brought by a private party against a state); see also Wisc. Dep’t of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381 (1998)
(holding that it is within the powers of a state to assert a sovereign immunity defense).
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In Seminole, the Seminole Tribe brought suit under IGRA claiming that the
state had failed to negotiate a compact agreement with the Tribe.80 The state invoked the Eleventh Amendment, claiming that Congress had unconstitutionally
abrogated state sovereign immunity in IGRA.81 The Court rejected arguments that
Congress was entitled to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its farreaching plenary powers to regulate Indian Commerce under Article I, Section 9.82
As a consequence, the Court invalidated the good-faith suit provision in IGRA.
The decision in Seminole effectively removed the teeth from the good faith requirements imposed on states through IGRA.83 It disrupted the balance between
state, federal, and tribal interests in the compacting process, investing states with
veto power over the compacting process. In fact, following Seminole, many states
simply refused to negotiate with tribes, thus speaking to the centrality of the suit
provision in enabling successful negotiations.84
The Secretary responded to Seminole by initiating a rulemaking process to implement the Secretarial Procedures and fill the gap left after Seminole.85 The regulations took effect in 1999 and provide tribes with an alternate remedy to the suit
provision, thereby eliminating the ability of states to avoid compact bargaining
altogether. The Secretarial Procedures are as follows:
1. A tribe formally requests that the state enter into compact negotiations.86
2. The state has 180 days to negotiate.87
3. If the state fails to respond, or no compact results, then the tribe may sue in
federal court.88
4. If the state successfully invokes sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment (consistent with Seminole), then the tribe may appeal to the
Secretary for redress by filing its compact proposal with the Secretary.89
5. The Secretary then has thirty days to determine if the tribe is eligible for
Class III gaming.90
6. If the tribe is eligible, the Secretary then submits the tribe’s proposal to the
state’s governor and attorney general.91
7. The governor and attorney general then have sixty days to comment on the
proposal and may submit an alternate proposal to the Secretary.92
From this point forward, the remainder of the process is dictated by whether the
state submits an alternate proposal. If it does not, then the process is as follows:

80. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 51–52.
81. Id. at 52.
82. Id. at 47. The text of the clause: “The Congress shall have power . . . To regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
83. RAND, supra note 7, at 94.
84. Kevin Washburn, Recurring Problems in Indian Gaming, 1 Wyo. L. Rev. 427, 430 (2001).
85. Texas v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 2d 765, 767 (W.D. Tex. 2004).
86. 25 C.F.R. § 291.3(a) (2009).
87. Id. § 291.3(b).
88. Id. § 291.3(c).
89. Id. § 291.3; see also id. § 291.4 (setting forth the requirements for a tribe’s proposal).
90. Id. § 291.6(b).
91. Id. § 291.7(a).
92. Id. § 291.7(b).
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The Secretary has sixty days to evaluate the compact proposal.93
The Secretary then submits a recommendation either to implement the proposal or to invite the parties to consider unresolved issues.94
10. If there are unresolved issues, the parties must meet within thirty days to
address the issues.95
11. Within thirty days of the conference to address unresolved issues, the Secretary either implements or rejects the proposal.96
8.
9.

If the state submits an alternate proposal, then the process is as follows:
12. The Secretary must appoint a mediator within thirty days.97
13. The mediator requests the last, best offers from each side.98
14. After hearing from both the state and the tribe, the mediator selects one
proposal, based upon its conformance with IGRA and other federal law.99
15. Within sixty days, the Secretary may either implement or reject the mediator’s proposed compact.100
16. If the Secretary rejects the proposal, the Secretary must notify each side
within sixty days as to how the proposal should be altered to make it
acceptable.101
The Secretarial Procedures are identical to the statutory procedures unless the
state invokes Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity in step three. Even then,
the Secretarial Procedures feature many of the same ingredients as the statutory
procedures under IGRA. The Secretarial Procedures include an opportunity for
both the tribe and the state to submit proposals to a mediator. However, unlike the
statutory procedures, the mediator is selected by the Secretary, not a federal judge,
and a mediator may be appointed without a judicial finding of bad faith on the part
of a state.102
The Secretarial Procedures restore the teeth to the good faith requirement set
forth in IGRA. States may not simply refuse to bargain a compact with an eligible
tribe. However, as the Texas litigation illustrates, some states were not inclined to
accept the Secretary’s decree without a fight.
III. THE ROUTE TO THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
The Kickapoo Tribe first sought to negotiate a Class III compact in 1995 under
the original statutory provisions of IGRA. However, when the Tribe approached
the state, Texas refused to negotiate.103 The Tribe filed suit pursuant to the good

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. § 291.8(a).
Id. § 291.8(b).
Id.
Id. § 291.8(c).
Id. § 291.9.
Id. § 291.10(a).
Id. § 291.10(b).
Id. § 291.11.
Id. § 291.11(c).
See id. § 291.9.
Texas v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 2d 765, 767 (W.D. Tex. 2004).
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faith provisions in IGRA, but the intervening decision by the Supreme Court in
Seminole prompted a dismissal of the claim in 1996.104
In 2003, following the enactment of the Secretarial Procedures, the Tribe submitted its Class III gaming application to the Secretary. After determining that the
Tribe’s application was complete and in compliance with IGRA regulations, the
Secretary invited Texas to comment or submit an alternate proposal.105
Texas responded by filing suit in the United States District Court, Western District of Texas, seeking a preliminary injunction and a stay of the administrative
proceedings of the United States.106 The court denied Texas’s application. Subsequently, Texas asked the court to invalidate the Secretarial Procedures on the basis
that the rules constituted an impermissible delegation of legislative authority and
that the gaming procedures were inconsistent with the Secretary’s role as “trustee”
of tribes under IGRA.107 The Tribe and the United States responded with claims
that Texas lacked standing to bring the action and that its claims were not ripe for
adjudication.108
The court found against Texas on all counts. First, the court determined that
Texas’s claims were not ripe. It concluded that the state’s injuries were just “conjectural” and that the state had failed to “show some hardship” in order to establish ripeness.109 On the substantive issues, the court concluded that the Secretarial
Procedures were a valid exercise of authority by the Secretary. The court upheld
the Secretarial Procedures on two bases. First, the court found that the Secretary’s
actions were implicitly authorized under IGRA.110 Second, the court concluded
that general prescriptions of authority for Indian affairs delegated to the Secretary
under federal law authorized the Secretary to act.111 The court concluded that the
Secretary was empowered to fill the gap left by Seminole in a manner consistent
with Congress’s intent. The court determined that the Secretarial Procedures constituted such an exercise of authority.112
IV. TEXAS V. UNITED STATES
Texas appealed the decision of the district court to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. The court reversed the Western District on all counts in a 2–1
ruling.113 The Tribe appealed to the United States Supreme Court, but certiorari
was denied in October 2008.114

104. Id.
105. Id. at 768.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 772.
110. Id. at 771.
111. Id. at 770. The statutes conveying general authority to the Secretary for Indian affairs are 25 U.S.C.
§§ 2, 9 (2009).
112. Texas, 362 F. Supp.2d at 770.
113. Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2007).
114. Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Tex. v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 32 (2008) (denial of cert.).
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A. The Application of Chevron to the Gaming Compact Process
After dispensing with the justiciability questions in favor of Texas, the court
moved to an analysis of the permissibility of the Secretary’s actions.115 The court
considered whether the rulemaking was consistent with the Secretary’s authority
under federal law, primarily IGRA. The court focused extensively upon the permissibility of the Secretary’s actions pursuant to the Chevron doctrine. The Chevron doctrine has evolved as the go-to mode of analysis in measuring the
reasonableness of executive agency rulemaking.116 The underlying principle that
characterizes the Chevron approach is one of agency deference. As long as the
agency’s rules reflect a “reasonable connection between [agency] choices and Congressional instructions,” agency rulemaking is afforded deference. The view of the
Chevron Court was that the executive branch, being more in tune and accountable
to political and policy matters, is better situated to make such judgments.117
Chevron prescribes a two-part test to determine the permissibility of administrative rules promulgated by federal executive agencies. First, the court must determine if there is an ambiguity present in the statute at bar. Second, the court must
determine if the rules reasonably flow from congressional intent.118 In Texas, the
court determined that the Secretarial Procedures failed on both measures.119
B. Chevron Step One
In the first step, the court makes an assessment as to whether the relevant statute unambiguously allows or prohibits the agency’s actions.120 If the court determines the statute is ambiguous, then the first inquiry is satisfied. Courts either rely
upon the “plain language” of statutes or apply the tools of statutory construction in
making the ambiguity determination.121 Step I involves the independent judgment
of the court. It is often the determinative step in the Chevron inquiry, as the second step involves much greater deference to the agency that promulgated the rules
in question.122 Thus, if a court concludes that ambiguity is present, then the likelihood of judicial deference to the agency is great. A recent study found that 89
percent of challenged agency rules were upheld under federal judicial review in the
second step of the Chevron analysis.123
Therefore, the focus of the Chevron analysis in Texas was whether ambiguity in
the IGRA compacting provision enabled the resulting administrative rule. For the
court in Texas, the answer was an unequivocal no. Writing for the majority, Chief
Judge Edith Jones124 determined that the plain language of the statute was unam115. Texas, 497 F.3d at 496–500.
116. Cass S. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 190 (2006).
117. Id.
118. See Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
119. Texas, 497 F.3d at 506.
120. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
121. Kristine Kordier Carnezis, Annotation, Construction and Application of “Chevron Deference” to
Administrative Action by United States Supreme Court, 3 A.L.R. FED. 2d 25 (2005).
122. Id.
123. Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S.
Court of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 31 (1998) (studying the application of the Chevron doctrine to cases
filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals in 1995 and 1996).
124. A graduate of the University of Texas School of Law, Judge Jones was appointed to the Fifth
Circuit by President Ronald Reagan in 1985 and confirmed by the U.S. Senate the same year. She has served
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biguous. She concluded that “the plain language of IGRA permits limited secretarial intervention only as a last resort . . .”125 In rejecting the United States’
argument that the statute conferred implicit authority upon the Secretary, the
court asserted that “IGRA’s meticulous description”126 of the remedial processes
and the role of the Secretary make clear when and how the Secretary may intervene.127 The court also dismissed the argument that Congress’s failure to explicitly
withhold the Secretary’s authority constituted implicit consent. The court admonished that agency authority “may not be lightly presumed.”128
The court also took up another potential source of ambiguity: a statutory gap,
created as a result of Seminole.129 Under this theory, an ambiguity results ex post
facto when a court acts to invalidate a portion of an existing statute. When remaining parts of the law that functioned in concert with the invalidated portions remain, the statute may operate in an ambiguous fashion. The agency may then act
to rectify any such ambiguity through rulemaking. In the context of the Texas litigation, the Seminole Court created a gap by invalidating the suit provision in
IGRA. The Secretary sought to address the resulting ambiguity via promulgation
of the Secretarial Procedures.
The majority in Texas rejected the Seminole gap as a basis to justify the Secretary’s actions.130 It argued that a statutory ambiguity justifying an administrative fix
may only be created by Congress, not as the result of a judicial decision that invalidates a portion of a statute. According to the court, “delegation is a matter of
legislative intent, not judicial interpretation.”131
The dissent in the case, authored by Judge James L. Dennis,132 takes a markedly
different tack. He argued that in circumstances where a gap has been created, implicit congressional authority exists to enact gap-filling rules. He contended that
judicial interpretation is the only way to identify a statutory gap. When the court
identifies a gap, it is a gap created by Congress and only later discovered by the
courts. In other words, judicial recognition does not constitute judicial creation. As
Judge Dennis articulated, “the Supreme Court [in Seminole] did not create the
gap . . . but merely declared its existence.”133
As such, the court has only identified a failure on the part of Congress to draft a
constitutionally compliant law. In effect, when a court makes a determination akin
to that in Seminole, its interpretation of the law takes retroactive effect, as if the
as Chief Judge since 2006. Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the United States Courts, Jones, Edith Hollan,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetInfo?jid=1194 (last visited Sept. 21, 2009). Prior to her appointment to the
court, she was in private practice in Houston, Texas, at the firm Andrews Kurth. John Council, Edith Jones
Takes Over as Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit, TEX. LAW., Jan. 23, 2006.
125. Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 501 (5th Cir. 2007).
126. Id. at 502.
127. Id.
128. Id. (quoting Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
129. Id. at 505.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Judge Dennis graduated from Louisiana State University Law School in 1962. He was appointed to
the Fifth Circuit by President William J. Clinton in 1995 and confirmed by the U.S. Senate the same year. Prior
to his appointment to the Fifth Circuit bench, Judge Dennis served for twenty years as an Associate Justice on
the Supreme Court of Louisiana. Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the United States Courts, Dennis, James
L., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetInfo?jid=605 (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).
133. Texas, 497 F.3d at 516–17 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
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law had been created by Congress in the judicially severed form.134 Under this
view, the ambiguity-causing gap in IGRA was created when Congress passed a bill
that included an unconstitutional remedial scheme.
The approach articulated by Judge Dennis finds support in previous federal
court decisions. In Pittston Co. v. United States, the Fourth Circuit considered a
highly analogous circumstance: the Supreme Court had created a statutory gap by
declaring a portion of the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefits Act (Coal Act)
unconstitutional in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel.135 The Coal Act created a multiemployer retiree benefit fund for workers in the U. S. coal industry.136 In Eastern
Enterprises, the Supreme Court determined that a provision of the Coal Act requiring certain employers to make retroactive contributions to the fund was unconstitutional.137 Those employers could no longer be required to contribute to the
fund, leaving some workers without an employer to fund their benefits.138
Under the Coal Act, the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) is
responsible for assigning employees to the contributing employers.139 When the
Court eliminated some employers from the fund in Eastern Enterprises, the Commissioner took steps to fill the resulting gap, enacting new administrative procedures based upon the Coal Act and Eastern Enterprises.140 Pittston involved a
challenge to this exercise of administrative discretion by the Commissioner.
In assessing the Commissioner’s actions in Pittston, the Fourth Circuit found the
situation warranted agency “gap-filling,”141 since the Coal Act created a circumstance “unprovided for”142 by Congress in the legislation. Namely, the court concluded that Congress did not provide for part of the Coal Act to be invalidated as
occurred in Eastern Enterprises, so the Commissioner had to step in and fill the
resulting gap in the regulatory apparatus.143 In A.T. Massey Coal Co. v. Holland,
the Fourth Circuit assessed its action in Pittston this way: “Once that gap was created [by the Supreme Court], the agency was left with an open policy space, which
was the quintessence of legislative-type action to which Chevron deference was
due.”144
Pittston also hints at another of Chief Judge Jones’s arguments: that Congress
anticipate future gaps in statutes and explicitly empower agencies to make rules
accordingly. The notion that Congress can see into the future seems optimistic at
best. Further, imposing such a stringent limitation on administrative agencies
would compromise their very purpose. Agencies exist to implement and regulate
laws passed by Congress, in a manner that is flexible and responsive to constituents
while still embodying the intent of Congress. As Judge Dennis stated in his dissent:
“It is inherent in the policymaking process that some unforeseen event, or ‘case

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See Harper v. Virginia Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993).
Pittston Co. v. United States, 368 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2004).
Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 514 (1998).
Id. at 500.
Pittston, 368 F.3d at 400.
Id. at 401–02.
Id.
Id. at 403.
Id.
See id. at 402.
A.T. Massey Coal Co. v. Holland, 472 F.3d 148, 168 (4th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).
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unprovided for’ could render a portion of a statute ambiguous or meaningless.”145
It is vital that agencies have the latitude to step in and fill the gap in a manner that
enables the regulated constituency to function consistent with Congress’s intent.
The courts—beginning with Chevron, have taken a similar view. Chevron stated
that Congress may leave a “gap” that implicitly empowers the agency to act.146 The
Ninth Circuit is perhaps most on point in the Indian gaming context. It considered
a suit brought by the Spokane Tribe of Indians against the State of Washington.
Washington, like Texas in the Kickapoo dispute, invoked its Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity in response to a tribal request to bargain a gaming compact.147
In assessing the position of the Spokane Tribe, the court offered,
We are left, then, with a tribe that believes it has followed IGRA faithfully
and has no legal recourse against a state that allegedly hasn’t bargained in
good faith. Congress did not intentionally create this situation and would
not have countenanced it had it known what we know now.148

Mindful of this “unintentionally” created situation, the Ninth Circuit endorsed the
Department of the Interior undertaking rulemaking to repair the gutted compacting remedy provision post-Seminole.149
Thus, despite the absence of an explicit congressional charge in IGRA to the
Secretary to circumvent an invalidated good faith provision, the agency may nevertheless act to fill the gap. The ambiguity in IGRA’s remedial scheme resulting
from Seminole is precisely the type of instance where the courts have found administrative rulemaking justified. A gap has been created due to an oversight on the
part of Congress. That gap has been revealed by the courts. Now, it is the agency’s
job to promulgate rules that fill the gap and preserve Congress’s intent. The presence of the gap is enough to satisfy the “ambiguity” step in the Chevron analysis,
despite the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Texas.
C. Chevron Step Two
Progressing to Chevron Step II is conditioned on a finding of statutory ambiguity in Step I. In Texas, the court undertook a Step II analysis, despite a failure to
find ambiguity in Step I. Step II is where the courts observe heightened deference
to agency rulemaking actions. Under Chevron, when a delegation of authority to
an agency is implicit, “a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the . . . agency.”150 Thus, in
the second step, the inquiry is one of reasonableness. Or, as the court articulated in
Texas, whether the agency action “reasonably effectuate[s]” Congress’s intent.151

145. Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 516 (5th Cir. 2007) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (citing Barnhardt v.
Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 169 (2003)).
146. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
147. United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, 139 F.3d 1297, 1298 (9th Cir. 1998).
148. Id. at 1302.
149. Id.
150. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
151. Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 506 (5th Cir. 2007).
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Courts may consider a wide range of sources to make this determination, including
the “language, policies and legislative history of the Act.”152
In Texas, the court began its analysis of the reasonableness of the Secretary’s
actions by conducting a review of Congress’s intent in enacting IGRA generally,
and the state compacting provisions specifically. It remarked that Congress endeavored to strike a “finely tuned balance” between state and tribal interests in
drafting IGRA.153 In the context of Class III gaming, Congress carefully arrived at
the conclusion that the compacts would protect the interests of states, and a judicial remedy would protect the interests of tribes. The Senate Report on the bill
characterized these offsetting tenets as the “best mechanism to assure that the interests of both sovereign entities are met with respect to the regulation of complex
gaming enterprises.”154 The court emphasized that, under IGRA, gaming may not
take place absent an in-force state and tribal compact.
The court’s analysis then compared the compacting procedure set forth in
IGRA to the Secretarial Procedures. The court concluded that the role of the Secretary under the Secretarial Procedures “bear[s] no resemblance” to the power
delegated the Secretary under IGRA.155 The court focused on four concerns regarding the Secretarial Procedures:
1.

The absence of a judicial finding of good faith before secretarial
involvement;156
2. Providing the Secretary with the authority to select a mediator, rather than
a federal district court;157
3. The right of the Secretary to implement a proposal at the end of the process,
apparently without respect to the proposals of the mediator, tribe, or
state;158
4. That the Secretarial Procedures “contemplate” gaming in the absence of a
tribal–state compact.159
In short, the majority was concerned that far too much power is placed in the
Secretary. It characterized the Secretary’s authority as “unbridled power to prescribe Class III regulations.”160 The court raised concerns that this concentration of
power in the Secretary might be unwise, given the “Secretary’s statutory trust obligation to protect the interests of Indian tribes,”161 suggesting that the Secretary
may be unable to act impartially in light of Interior’s obligation to further tribal
well-being. Even when viewed in the context of “their place in the overall statutory
scheme,”162 Chief Judge Jones wrote that the Secretarial Procedures run too far
afoul of what “Congress enacted into law.”163
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985).
Texas, 497 F.3d at 506.
S. Rep. No. 100-446, at 13 (1988).
Texas, 497 F.3d at 508.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 509 (citations omitted).
Id.
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The court’s concerns constitute a narrow view of Congress’s intent under
IGRA. While it is clear that Congress intended to appease the concerns of states in
the wake of the Cabazon decision, it is just as clear that tribal economic development and successful compacting were central goals of Congress in enacting
IGRA.164 As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently opined, IGRA was enacted “in large part to ‘provide a statutory basis for
the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.’”165 In a partial rebuttal of the Texas court’s contentions, the D.C. Circuit also contended, “IGRA
was designed primarily to establish a legal basis for Indian gaming as part of fostering tribal economic self-sufficiency, not to respond to community concerns about
casinos.”166
Much of the debate about congressional intent may be moot, however, because
there seems to be consensus that Congress did desire at least some degree of balance between states and tribes. While it may be disputed how even that balance
was meant to be, it is beyond dispute that post-Seminole, IGRA is completely devoid of balance—“finely-tuned” or otherwise. The elimination of the sole remedy
available to tribes to enforce the compacting protocol effectively guts the statute,
placing veto control in the hands of states. As the Ninth Circuit noted in Spokane
Tribe, the “tribe’s right to sue the state is a key part of the . . . balancing”167 inherent in Congress’s intent.
Given this state of affairs, Chevron deference seems especially appropriate. As
Judge Dennis points out in the dissent, it is not the court’s role to intensely scrutinize the agency’s actions in Step II of Chevron.168 The pertinent inquiry for the
court is whether Congress would have sanctioned the administrative rules.169
Interestingly, it is within the power of the states to avoid the Secretarial Procedures altogether by simply waiving sovereign immunity and enabling a judicial inquiry into the good faith question. If states want the benefit of the balanced
approach in the IGRA statute, then waiving sovereign immunity guarantees access
to those procedures. It is only when states want to contravene Congress’s intent
and refuse to bargain with tribes that the Secretarial Procedures are applied. As
Judge Dennis notes, even if a state invokes its Eleventh Amendment rights, the
Secretarial Procedures supply ample opportunity for state participation long
before the Secretary is empowered to implement any compact unilaterally. In fact,
the dissent suggests that a state meeting its obligation to bargain in good faith is
likely to reach an agreement long before the Secretary has the authority to issue
any dictates.170
164. See 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (1988).
165. Texas, 497 F.3d at 521–22 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (quoting TOMAC, Taxpayers of Mich. Against
Casinos v. Norton, 433 F.3d 852, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
166. Id. at 522 (emphasis added) (quoting Citizens Exposing Truth About Casinos v. Kempthorne, 492
F.3d 460, 469 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
167. United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, 139 F.3d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1998).
168. Texas, 497 F.3d at 522 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (“We do not ask whether the Procedures . . . are
ideal, or whether there is some way they can be improved.” (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,
229 (2001))).
169. Id. at 523 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984)).
170. Id. at 524 (“It seems unlikely that a state, negotiating in good faith, would fully proceed through
this process without coming to some agreement with the tribe.”).
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The majority in Texas also expressed concern that the Secretary cannot be entrusted with the responsibility to appoint a neutral mediator.171 However, under
IGRA, Congress broadly authorized the Secretary to implement and regulate tribal gaming. The court’s contention that the Secretary can’t be trusted to appoint a
mediator is at odds with the wide range of responsibilities dedicated to the Secretary in IGRA. Most notably, the power to cancel an agreed upon compact.172 Congress made the Secretary a focal point of IGRA, with considerable power.
Granting the Secretary the authority under the Secretarial Procedures to appoint a
mediator seems consistent with that statutory grant.
The final shortcoming of the majority’s argument lies in its contention that the
Secretarial Procedures invest too much authority in the Secretary generally. This
ignores the plain language of the Secretarial Procedures. Assuming the state submits an alternate proposal, then the Secretary is substantially bound by the mediator’s proposal. While it is true that the Secretary can reject a mediator’s offering,
that authority is confined.173 In fact, the Secretary’s actions must “comport with the
mediator’s selected proposal as much as possible.”174 Judge Dennis, in comparing
the procedure under IGRA to the Secretarial Procedures went so far as to argue
that “it is unclear which of the two is the more restrictive on the Secretary—and
the regulations certainly do not grant ‘unbridled power to prescribe Class III
regulations.’”175
Ultimately, the Chevron Step II analysis inquires as to whether Congress would
sanction the rulemaking of the agency. Given its desire to provide tribes with a
remedy that ensured good faith bargaining and heightened the likelihood of successful compact negotiations, it seems reasonable to conclude that Congress would
approve of the Secretarial Procedures. Had Congress been prescient about the
outcome in Seminole, it would have almost certainly adopted an alternate remedy
to achieve balance in compact negotiations. While it may not have been a carbon
copy of the Secretarial Procedures, it likely would have effected the same outcome: a remedy to force states to the table to negotiate or face the imposition of a
compact by the federal government.
D. The General Statutory Authority of the Secretary to Implement Acts of
Congress Relating to Indian Affairs
The Secretary enjoys wide-ranging general statutory authority to implement
acts of Congress related to Indian affairs through administrative rulemaking.176
This authority derives from the general Indian trust statutes and is rooted in the

171. Id. at 508 (majority opinion). The Secretarial Procedures empower the Secretary to appoint a mediator when both the tribe and state submit compact proposals. Under IGRA, a mediator is appointed by the
court if the tribe and the state are unable to reach an agreement sixty days after a judicial determination of
bad faith on the part of the state. See supra Part II.
172. Supra Part II.
173. The Secretary may only disapprove the mediator’s proposal if it violates federal or state law, federal trust obligations to the tribe, or if it fails to comport with the technical requirements for a proposal. 25
C.F.R. § 291.11(b)(2009).
174. Id. § 291.11(c).
175. Texas, 497 F.3d at 524 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
176. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9 (2009).
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Marshall trilogy from the 1830s.177 Ever since this grant of statutory authority came
into effect, it has served as the basis for the Secretary’s administrative authority in
implementing the federal government’s trust responsibilities to tribes.178
The Texas court was dismissive of this statutory grant of authority as a basis for
the Secretary’s action in promulgating the Secretarial Procedures.179 In a brief assessment, Chief Judge Jones argued that the Secretary’s general rulemaking authority for Indian affairs is only triggered pursuant to an affirmative statutory
directive. The court took the position that without a particularized grant of statutory authority, the Secretary is not authorized to act under his general powers. It
posited that the general Indian trust statutory rulemaking authority does not confer on the Secretary a “general power to make rules governing Indian conduct.”180
The court relied primarily on a case with circumstances not analogous to those
in Texas, casting doubt on its conclusions. In that case, the Secretary issued fishing
regulations in Alaska without any underlying statutory grant of authority.181 His
regulations were without statutory antecedent and essentially constituted unilateral legislating on his part.182 What’s more, Congress had expressly limited the Secretary’s general rulemaking authority for the subject matter affected by the new
regulations.183 This stands in stark contrast to the situation in Texas, where IGRA
provides a clear statutory basis for the Secretary’s actions and there are no limits
set forth by Congress on the exercise of the Secretary’s general Indian trust statutory rulemaking powers.
The majority in Texas also relied upon United States v. Eberhardt for its view
that a particular statutory antecedent must be in place to justify the exercise of the
general authority.184 As Judge Dennis points out, Eberhardt does just the opposite.
That court held that “the general trust statutes in Title 25 do furnish Interior with
broad authority to supervise and manage Indian affairs and property commensurate with the trust obligations of the United States.”185 The Eberhardt court added,
“Congress must be assumed to have given Interior reasonable power to discharge
its broad responsibilities for the management of Indian affairs effectively.”186
The court also questioned whether the Secretary’s general authority is limited to
the management of natural trust resources, like land, water, and minerals.187 Some
177. The general trust statutes “authorize the adoption and promulgation of suitable rules and regulations for the carrying into effect of the various provisions of the acts of Congress relating to Indian affairs.”
United States v. Van Wert, 195 F. 974, 978 (N.D. Iowa 1912). Section Two states: “The Commissioner of Indian
Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the
President may prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs and of all matters arising out of Indian
relations.” 25 U.S.C. § 2 (2009). Section Nine states: “The President may prescribe such regulations as he may
think fit for carrying into effect the various provisions of any act relating to Indian affairs, and for the settlement of the accounts of Indian affairs.” 25 U.S.C. § 9 (2009).
178. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Gaming on Indian Reservations: Defining the Trustee’s Duty in the Wake of
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 121, 143 (1997).
179. Texas, 497 F.3d at 509–10.
180. Id. at 509 (quoting Organized Vill. of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 63 (1962)).
181. Organized Vill. of Kake, 369 U.S. at 63.
182. Texas, 497 F.3d at 518 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 510 (majority opinion) (citing United States v. Eberhardt, 789 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir.
1986)).
185. Id. at 518 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
186. Id. (citation omitted).
187. Id. at 510 n.19.
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scholars, including Professor Alex Skibine, have argued that the trust responsibility should apply more generally to tribal interests and sovereignty, including tribal
economic matters.188 In some recent cases, courts have signaled an expanded scope
of the trust responsibility to policy areas like healthcare and education.189 Professor
Skibine also suggested that perhaps IGRA itself confers trust status on Indian
gaming revenues, due to the language in the law190—namely, the reference in the
congressional findings of IGRA to tribal self-sufficiency, strong tribal government,
and tribal economic development.191
The issue may well come down to what exactly the Secretarial Procedures are
intended to accomplish. It is undeniable that IGRA authorizes a regulatory regime
that imposes a good faith requirement on states to bargain with tribes. Since there
is a considerable basis to conclude that the Secretarial Procedures enforce this
statutory requirement, there is little wiggle room to contest the Secretary’s actions
under the general authority statutes.
V. LIFE AFTER TEXAS
For tribes like the Kickapoo, Texas is a dead end. When states act to invoke
sovereign immunity, tribes have little recourse in the post-Texas world. Tribes must
now hope for outside intervention, either in the form of a congressional fix to
IGRA, or a willingness on the part of the U.S. Department of Justice to sue states
to enforce the good faith provisions in IGRA.192
Given the current political landscape, both of these avenues seem unlikely to
bear fruit. The proliferation of Indian gaming has resulted in a backlash against
tribes that has found refuge in the halls of Congress. The scandal involving former
tribal lobbyist Jack Abramoff,193 the push for off-reservation casinos,194 and the

188. See Skibine, supra note 178, at 145; see also Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the
Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1242–46 (1975); Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and
Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 109, 109.
189. Skibine, supra note 178, at 145–46 (citing White v. Califano, 581 F.2d 697, 698 (8th Cir. 1978);
Meyers v. Bd. of Educ. of the San Juan Sch. Dist., 23 Indian L. Rep. 3045 (D. Utah 1995)).
190. Id. at 146.
191. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994) (“[A] principal goal of Federal Indian policy is to promote tribal
economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government . . . .”)).
192. The Tribe actually has reason for renewed hope at the state level. There is a movement afoot in the
2009 session of the Texas legislature (Senate Bill 1084 and Senate Joint Resolution 31) to legalize casino
gaming in the state, including on tribal lands. Among other things, the legislation would authorize twelve fullservice destination casinos. Alan Sayre, Analysis: In Texas, Will Gambling Raise Its Head?, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Feb. 27, 2009, http://www.timesrecordnews.com/news/2009/feb27/analysis-texts-will-gambling-raise-itshead/. In order to be enacted, the measure must first be passed by the legislature and then by Texas voters. In
a recent survey, the Texas Gaming Association found that sixty-eight percent of Texas voters would support
the amendment. Press Release, Texas Gaming Association (Feb. 23, 2009) (on file with author).
193. Jack Abramoff worked as a lobbyist representing tribal interests on gaming issues, mostly between
2002 and 2003. During that period, he accrued more than eighty million dollars in fees from tribal clients.
Susan Schmidt & James V. Grimaldi, The Fast Rise and Steep Fall of Jack Abramoff, WASH. POST, Dec. 29,
2005, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/28/AR2005122801
588.html (last visited June 12, 2009). Concerns about exorbitant fees and public corruption prompted an investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice in 2004. Id. In 2006, Abramoff struck a deal with the United States,
pleading guilty to fraud, tax evasion, and conspiracy to bribe public officials. Susan Schmidt & James V. Grimaldi, Abramoff Pleads Guilty to Three Counts, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2006, at A01, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/03/AR2006010300474.html (last visited June 12,
2009). He admitted in the plea that he had defrauded four tribes, and he was required to pay those tribes

R

R

\\server05\productn\N\NMX\39-3\NMX303.txt

546

unknown

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Seq: 20

18-JUN-10

11:45

[Vol. 39

emergence of highly profitable tribal casinos in the Northeast, California, and elsewhere, have resulted in considerable antipathy being directed at tribes.195 Even
traditional tribal allies, like Republican Senator John McCain, have called for
greater scrutiny of tribal economic decisions in the wake of the Abramoff affair.196
McCain also sponsored amendments to IGRA that would have effectively eliminated a provision enabling off-reservation casinos.197 Democrats in Congress have
also demonstrated opposition to tribal positions on issues like off-reservation gaming. In a recent vote that would have authorized off-reservation gaming for two
Michigan tribes, the House of Representatives rejected the measure 298 to 121.198
This vote marked the first occasion since the Abramoff scandal where Congress
considered a major Indian gaming measure.199 Clearly, the environment did not
prove hospitable.
Despite these difficulties in Congress, the election of Barack Obama has renewed optimisim among tribal interests. During the campaign and since the election, President Obama has repeatedly sent positive signals to tribal interests. He
visited tribes throughout the country during the campaign, emphasizing his commitment to a strong government-to-government relationship between the federal
government and the tribes, with both parties enjoying the status of “equals.”200
This outward recognition and elevation of tribal sovereignty is an encouraging sign
for tribal leaders. It remains to be seen how Obama’s campaign gestures will translate into Indian gaming policy.
If Congress does signal an interest in fixing IGRA, it may find an effective and
politically viable solution elusive. Given the problem that has arisen in the wake of
Seminole and Texas—namely, states unwilling to negotiate compacts in good
faith—the best fix is to remove states from the process and impose a federal regu-

millions of dollars in restitution. Id. Abramoff is currently in federal prison. It is ironic that Abramoff’s victimization of tribes has resulted in a less hospitable environment for tribes in Washington, perhaps driven by the
view that the sudden influx of gaming revenues have resulted in sudden largesse that tribes are unprepared to
manage. See Susan Schmidt, A Jackpot from Indian Gaming Tribes, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2004, at A01, available at http:www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn//A60906-1004Feb21?language=printer (last visited June 12,
2009).
194. 25 U.S.C. § 2719 (1988). Under IGRA, tribes are generally only allowed to operate tribal gaming
facilities on existing tribal lands. IGRA does prescribe a very rigorous process for tribes seeking permission to
build off-reservation. This process almost never results in success for tribes.
195. Tribal gaming revenues tend to be concentrated among a few large casinos. For instance, in 2007,
just 18.1 percent of tribal gaming establishments accounted for 72.3 percent of the revenue generated by
Indian gaming in the United States. National Indian Gaming Association, NIGC Tribal Gaming Revenues
2007, http://www.nigc.gov/Portals/0/NIGC%20Uploads/Tribal%20Data/gamingrevenues2007.pdf. (last visited
Dec. 22, 2008).
196. Paternalism or Protection? Federal Review of Tribal Economic Decisions in Indian Gaming, 12
GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 435, 435 (2008) (panel discussion).
197. See Matthew D. All, John McCain and the Indian Gaming “Backlash”: The Unfortunate Irony of S.
2078, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 295–96 (2005).
198. Dennis J. Whittlesey, Washington’s Newest Battle: Indian Gaming v. Indian Gaming, 12 GAMING L.
REV. & ECON. 408, 410 (2008).
199. Id.
200. Chairman Ron His Horse Is Thunder, Is Obama’s Election a “New Day” for Native Americans?,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, http://www.indiancountrytoday.com/opinion/columnists/39907672.html (last visited
June 16, 2009).
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latory scheme instead.201 This approach is also more in line with the traditional
roles of the state and federal governments in Indian Country.202
However, since IGRA reflects Congress’s effort to balance state and tribal interests, it is likely to insist upon continued state and tribal power-sharing. Moreover, a solution that precludes the states would probably be dead on arrival
politically. By now, too many states have become too accustomed to playing a
regulatory role in Indian gaming to assume they will cede their role without concerted resistance.
To avoid upsetting the state role under IGRA, it has been persistently advocated that Congress enact a fix that leaves IGRA intact but restores its bite by
requiring the Department of Justice to sue states to enforce the good faith provision in IGRA. This idea has been advocated by a variety of sources—from academics, to federal tribal gaming regulators, to the federal courts.203 It is based on
the theory that the special responsibility owed by the federal government to tribes
includes an obligation to sue to enforce tribal rights.204 Of course, the attorney
general also has the “inherent duty” to uphold federal law generally.205
In at least one instance, a court has found an obligation on the part of a U.S.
Attorney to sue a state pursuant to the IGRA good faith provision. In Chemehuevi
Indian Tribe v. Wilson, the court found that IGRA imposed an implied duty on the
U.S. Attorney to act.206 The court reasoned that absent action by the U.S. Attorney, the balance between the state and tribe intended by Congress in IGRA would
be contravened.207 Only the U.S. Attorney can reach a state that refuses to bargain
in good faith.208
However, there are also compelling reasons to believe that this approach is not
a slam-dunk solution. For instance, other courts have reached a different conclusion than Chemehuevi. In United States v. 1020 Electronic Gaming Machines, the
court concluded that there was no basis to read an implied duty into IGRA and
that the court’s remedy in Chemehuevi did not dovetail with Congress’s intent in
IGRA.209 It left the decision to sue up to the U.S. Attorney, demurring to impose a
duty under IGRA.210 One commentator has also pointed out that the scheme
would put the United States in a difficult position, litigating against the states.211
Thus, Chemehuevi, now more than ten years decided, appears to stand more as an
exception than as the standard practice. Whether a new Congress and a new President change this state of affairs remains to be seen. What seems beyond dispute,

201. See, e.g., Chris Rausch, The Problem with Good Faith: The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act a Decade
After Seminole, 11 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 423, 430 (2007).
202. Namely, Congress’s plenary power. See supra text accompanying note 20.
203. Rausch, supra note 201, at 431.
204. There is also a statutory basis to support the theory. To wit: “In all states and territories where there
are reservations or allotted Indians the United States District Attorney shall represent them in all suits at law
and equity.” 25 U.S.C. § 175 (2009).
205. See Rausch, supra note 201, at 431.
206. 987 F. Supp. 804, 808 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
207. Id.
208. Rausch, supra note 201, at 431.
209. 38 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1216–17 (E.D. Wash. 1998).
210. Id. at 1218.
211. Rausch, supra note 201, at 432.
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however, is that tribes, the states, and the federal courts all look to Congress to
end its post-Seminole silence.
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision in Texas v. United States has upset the delicate balance envisioned
by Congress in the state–tribal compact provisions of IGRA. States are no longer
bound by the good faith requirement set forth in IGRA and may refuse to bargain
with tribes at all. This was precisely the approach undertaken by the State of Texas
when it was approached by the Kickapoo Tribe to negotiate a gaming compact.
The ruling in Texas v. United States validates this action and leaves the Kickapoo
without a remedy to get Texas to the bargaining table.
The reasoning set forth by the majority in Texas has a number of shortcomings.
The court failed to find any ambiguity in the IGRA statute despite it being fundamentally altered by the U.S. Supreme Court in Seminole. The court also failed to
see a link between Congress’s desire to enable tribal Class III gaming and the
Secretarial Procedures. Finally, the court refused to accept the general authority
conferred to the Secretary of the Interior under U.S. law as a basis for the Secretary’s post-Seminole rulemaking.
There are substantial flaws in the court’s reasoning, and the consequences are
serious. The state compacting provisions in IGRA are essentially moot in the face
of a recalcitrant state within the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction. Tribes like the Kickapoo are left with few alternatives.
The likelihood that a tribe can look to the federal government for assistance
also appears remote. More than a decade has passed since the Supreme Court
decided Seminole, and Congress has demonstrated little inclination to promulgate
a fix. Growing antipathy toward Indian gaming in Congress suggests that the status
quo will persist. It also seems unlikely that tribes can rely upon the Department of
Justice to sue to enforce the good faith provision in IGRA absent a major change
in policy. However, the election of President Barack Obama has inspired some
optimism among tribal leaders.
The net result of this state of affairs is impotence for the Kickapoo and others
seeking to negotiate gaming compacts with unwilling states. Tribes will be relegated to two tiers: one for tribes fortunate enough to enter into gaming compacts
before Seminole and Texas, and those who had the misfortune to come later. This
hierarchy promises to undermine Congress’s high-minded objectives in IGRA to
advance tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and sovereignty.

